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ARTICLES
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Andrew P. Sherrod *
Jaime B. Wisegarver **
I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys recent significant developments in Virginia
civil practice and procedure. The article discusses opinions of the
Supreme Court of Virginia from June 2012 through June 2013
addressing civil procedure topics, significant amendments to the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia concerning procedural is-
sues during the same period, and legislation enacted by the Vir-
ginia General Assembly during its 2013 session that relates to
civil practice.
II. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Evidence
The Supreme Court of Virginia has recently issued a number of
opinions discussing various issues related to evidence. In Allied
Concrete Co. v. Lester, the court tackled the question of whether
misconduct by the plaintiff and his attorney, specifically the spo-
liation of Facebook evidence, necessitated a new trial.' This high-
ly publicized case arose out of a car accident that occurred in Al-
bemarle County, Virginia when William Sprouse, an employee of
* Principal, Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2000, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law; B.A., 1996, Hampden-Sydney College.
** Associate, Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2010, University of
Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2005 University of Virginia.
1. 285 Va. 295, 301, 736 S.E.2d 699, 701-02 (2013).
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Allied Concrete Company ("Allied"), lost control of his vehicle,
causing it to tip over and land on the vehicle occupied by Isaiah
Lester, killing Lester's wife.' Lester, as administrator and benefi-
ciary of his wife's estate, filed a complaint against both Allied and
Sprouse for the wrongful death of his wife and for his own per-
sonal injuries.'
At trial, a jury awarded Lester over $8 million.' Allied subse-
quently filed multiple post-trial motions, including a motion for
sanctions against Lester and his attorney.! The motion for sanc-
tions alleged that Lester had conspired with his attorney to inten-
tionally and improperly destroy evidence related to Lester's Face-
book account and that Lester had provided false information and
testimony related to his Facebook page.' Allied argued that an e-
mail from the attorney's paralegal to Lester instructing Lester to
"clean up" his Facebook page, as well as the attorney's later rep-
resentation that Lester did not have a Facebook page, constituted
deception, misconduct, and spoliation of evidence.! Allied also
filed a motion in the alternative seeking a new trial.' After exten-
sive discovery and hearings on the post-trial motions, including
the motion for sanctions, the trial court sanctioned the attorney
$542,000 and Lester $180,000 to cover Allied's attorney's fees and
costs in addressing and defending against the misconduct.!
On appeal, Allied argued that the trial court erred in denying
its motion for a retrial, claiming that the entire trial had been
tainted by the unethical and dishonest conduct of Lester and his
attorney.'o The supreme court disagreed, holding that because Al-
lied was fully aware of the misconduct prior to trial, all of the spo-
liation evidence had been presented to the jury, the jury had been
properly instructed, and the trial court did not err in refusing to
grant a retrial." The court went on to say that the record demon-
strated that Allied received a fair trial on the merits, as the trial
2. Id. at 300, 736 S.E.2d at 701.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 301, 736 S.E.2d at 701.
5. Id.
6. Id., 736 S.E.2d at 701-02.
7. Id. at 301-02, 736 S.E.2d at 702. The attorney instructed the paralegal to tell
Lester to "clean up" his Facebook page. Id. at 302, 736 S.E.2d at 702.
8. See id. at 301, 736 S.E.2d at 702.
9. Id. at 303, 736 S.E.2d at 703.
10. Id. at 306-07, 736 S.E.2d at 705.
11. Id. at 306-08, 736 S.E.2d at 705.
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court took significant steps to mitigate the effects of the miscon-
duct.12 Thus, the supreme court concluded that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a retrial. 3
In 21st Century Systems, Inc. v. Perot Systems Government
Services, Inc., the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether
the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to support the
award of damages.14 The action arose when Perot Government
Services, Inc. ("Perot") brought suit against former employees, as-
serting conspiracy, violation of Virginia's Uniform Trade Secret
Act, and other claims based upon the defendants' alleged attempt
to destroy and steal Perot's business by unfairly and improperly
using Perot's confidential and proprietary information.' Perot
sought damages to compensate for the loss of revenue and profits
associated with the business misappropriated by the defendants,
for the forensic investigation conducted to determine the extent to
which Perot's confidential files and trade secrets had been com-
promised, and for the loss of goodwill. 6 Prior to trial, the defend-
ants moved to strike the testimony of Perot's designated expert
on the basis that the expert's opinions concerned matters that
were within the ordinary knowledge of the jury and thus did not
assist the jury in understanding the facts." Alternatively, the de-
fendants argued that the expert's opinions were speculative and
uncertain and thus, precluded.'" The trial court denied the de-
fendants' motion to strike."
During the trial, the expert testified as to how he valued
Perot's lost goodwill, as well as how he estimated Perot's lost prof-
its.20 At the close of Perot's case-in-chief, the defendants again
12. Id. at 307-08, 736 S.E.2d at 705. On appeal, Allied also argued that the trial court
had erred in denying its motion for a mistrial on the grounds that one of the jurors had
failed to answer a voir dire question honestly. Id. at 308, 736 S.E.2d at 706. In considering
whether the juror's silence following a question about her relationship with the attorney's
law firm amounted to a dishonest response to a material question, the court determined
that her response was not dishonest. Id. at 308-10, 736 S.E.2d at 706-07. Thus, the su-
preme court affirmed the decision of the trial court on that ground as well. See id. at 310,
736 S.E.2d at 707.
13. Id. at 313, 736 S.E.2d at 709.
14. 284 Va. 32, 40-41, 726 S.E.2d 236, 240 (2012).
15. Id. at 36, 726 S.E.2d at 238.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 37, 726 S.E.2d at 238.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 38, 726 S.E.2d at 239.
20. See id. at 37-38, 726 S.E.2d at 238-39.
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moved to strike the expert's testimony, relying on the same ar-
guments they had made before trial.2 ' The trial court denied the
motion.2 ' The jury returned a verdict in favor of Perot on all
claims and awarded Perot both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages.23 Following the verdict, the defendants moved to set aside
the verdict and strike the counts or, in the alternative, for mistri-
al or remittitur, arguing that Perot had failed to prove its damag-
es by using a proper method or factual foundation and that Perot
had received duplicative damages.24
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia evaluated the suffi-
ciency of the evidence of goodwill damages, holding that Perot
had failed to demonstrate that it had actually lost any goodwill.25
In valuing Perot's goodwill, the expert had looked to the sale price
of Perot's parent corporation when it was sold during the penden-
cy of the litigation, as well as the value of the parent corporation's
identifiable assets." The court held that this evidence was insuffi-
cient to demonstrate that Perot itself had actually lost any good-
will." Rather than consider a comparable sale of part of Perot's
own business, the expert focused only on the sale price and assets
of Perot's parent corporation, which was not affected in any way
by the defendants' actions.2 8 Comparable sales information was
essential to support an award of lost goodwill damages, and thus,
the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the defend-
ants' motions to strike and erred when it refused to set aside the
award of damages relating to Perot's lost goodwill.2 9
In Funkhouser v. Ford Motor Co., the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia discussed the substantial similarity test in determining the
admissibility of evidence. 0 The plaintiff brought a products liabil-
21. Id. at 38, 726 S.E.2d at 239.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 39-40, 726 S.E.2d at 239-40.
24. Id. at 40, 726 S.E.2d at 240.
25. Id. at 46, 726 S.E.2d at 243.
26. Id. at 44-45, 726 S.E.2d at 242-43. The expert valued Perot's goodwill by using
figures reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission following the sale of Perot's
parent corporation, namely: (1) the actual sale price of the parent; (2) the value of the par-
ent's identifiable assets; and (3) the purchaser's valuation of the goodwill attributable to
Perot as the parent's public sector. Id., 726 S.E.2d at 242.
27. Id. at 45, 726 S.E.2d at 242.
28. Id. at 44-45, 726 S.E.2d at 242-43.
29. Id. at 46, 726 S.E.2d at 243.
30. 285 Va. 272, 281-84, 736 S.E.2d 309, 313-15 (2013).
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ity action against Ford Motor Company ("Ford") after his daugh-
ter died from burns suffered when the family's Ford Windstar
caught fire." On appeal, the issue before the supreme court was
whether the circuit court erred in excluding evidence of seven
other Ford Windstar fires and in ruling that the plaintiffs expert
witnesses could not rely on the excluded evidence.32
In affirming the decision of the circuit court, the supreme court
held that the evidence of the other Ford Windstar fires failed the
substantial similarity test because the plaintiff was unable to
identify the cause of the other fires and because the plaintiff
could not rule out all other possible causes of those fires." Be-
cause the plaintiff could not demonstrate that the other fires were
caused by the same or similar defect, the evidence was inadmissi-
ble."
The court went on to address the plaintiffs alternative argu-
ment that the circuit court erred in ruling that his experts could
not rely upon the evidence of the prior fires in their testimony re-
garding how a reasonable automobile manufacturer would react
to those fires." The supreme court affirmed the circuit court on
this point as well, holding that an expert "cannot offer opinion
testimony based on evidence that fails the substantial similarity
test."" The court explained, "To hold otherwise would be to allow
an expert to offer an opinion based on speculative or otherwise ir-
relevant evidence."" In this case, the court found that there were
too many "missing variables" to permit expert testimony based
upon the other Ford Windstar fires."
31. Id. at 275, 736 S.E.2d at 311.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 283-85, 736 S.E.2d at 315-16.
34. Id. at 283-84, 736 S.E.2d at 315.
35. Id. at 284-85, 736 S.E.2d at 315-16. In making this argument, the plaintiff relied
upon Virginia Code section 8.01-401.1, which states, in pertinent part: "The facts, circum-
stances or data relied upon by [an expert] witness in forming an opinion or drawing infer-
ences, if of a type normally relied upon by others in the particular field of expertise in
forming opinions and drawing inferences, need not be admissible in evidence." VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013); Funkhouser, 285 Va. at 284, 736 S.E.2d at 315.
36. Funkhouser, 285 Va. at 285, 736 S.E.2d at 316.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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B. Nonsuits
In Inova Health Care Services v. Kebaish, the Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the trial court's decision to allow the plaintiff to
take a nonsuit on the second day of the jury trial." Adel Kebaish,
an orthopedic/spine surgeon, had entered into a Professional Ser-
vices Agreement with Inova Fairfax Hospital to provide on-call
trauma services on a non-exclusive basis.40 Dr. Kebaish later filed
a nine-count complaint against multiple defendants, including
Inova Health Care Services ("Inova"), which set forth allegations
of defamation, breach of contract, tortious interference, common
law conspiracy, statutory conspiracy, wrongful termination, and
unjust enrichment." Two of the individual defendants were offic-
ers in the United States Army and were alleged by Dr. Kebaish to
have acted in their individual capacities and outside the scope of
their respective employments.42 As a result, the United States At-
torney removed the case to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia.43 The federal district court then
granted Dr. Kebaish leave to amend his complaint.4 4 The amend-
ed complaint did not name either of the Army officers as defend-
ants but did seek to recover the same damages as the initial com-
plaint." Dr. Kebaish later filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) prior to
Inova filing an answer to the amended complaint.46
Next, Dr. Kebaish filed a complaint against Inova in the Cir-
cuit Court of Fairfax County. 47 The case proceeded to trial and on
the second day, Dr. Kebaish informed the trial court that he
wished to nonsuit the case. Inova objected, arguing that a volun-
tary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in federal court was equivalent to a nonsuit un-
der Virginia Code section 8.01-380(B)." The trial court overruled
39. 284 Va. 336, 342, 346, 732 S.E.2d 703, 706, 708 (2012).
40. Id. at 339, 732 S.E.2d at 704.
41. Id. at 339-40, 732 S.E.2d at 704-05.
42. Id. at 340, 732 S.E.2d at 705.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 340-41, 732 S.E.2d at 705.
46. Id. at 341, 732 S.E.2d at 705.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 342, 732 S.E.2d at 706.
49. Id.
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Inova's objection and permitted Dr. Kebaish to take a nonsuit as
a matter of right."o
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the cir-
cuit court's ruling: "Although a voluntarily dismissal and a non-
suit provide a plaintiff with a similar procedural right, the exer-
cise of that right varies significantly."" The court explained that,
in federal procedure, a voluntary dismissal as a matter of right is
available only if exercised at the outset of the proceeding, where-
as use of a nonsuit under Virginia Code section 8.01-380(A) may
be exercised much later in the case-even at trial.5 ' Accordingly,
the right to take a nonsuit in a Virginia state court is much more
expansive than the right to a federal voluntary dismissal.5 ' The
court found no support for Inova's contention that a voluntary
dismissal in federal court was the equivalent of a nonsuit.5 Ra-
ther, the court explained that a nonsuit "is only the functional
equivalent to a voluntary dismissal to the extent that both a non-
suit and a voluntary dismissal provide a plaintiff with a method
to voluntarily dismiss the suit up until a specified time in the
proceeding."5 Thus, the supreme court held the trial court did not
err in permitting Dr. Kebaish to take a nonsuit."
C. Tolling of the Statute of Limitations
In McKinney v. Virginia Surgical Associates, P. C., the Supreme
Court of Virginia interpreted the tolling provision of Virginia
Code section 8.01-229(E)(3) as it affects the running of the statute
of limitations after a nonsuit." McKinney arose out of the death of
Gene L. McKinney following abdominal surgery performed by
physicians at Virginia Surgical Associates, P.C. ("Virginia Surgi-
cal Associates")." Prior to his death, the decedent filed a medical
malpractice action against Virginia Surgical Associates." The
case was converted to a wrongful death proceeding upon his
50. Id.
51. Id. at 345, 732 S.E.2d at 707.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 345-46, 732 S.E.2d at 707-08.
55. Id. at 346, 732 S.E.2d at 708.
56. Id.
57. 284 Va. 455, 457, 732 S.E.2d 27, 28 (2012).
58. Id. at 458, 732 S.E.2d at 28.
59. Id.
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death." The decedent's widow, Geneva L. McKinney, as adminis-
trator of the decedent's estate, was substituted as plaintiff.6 After
conducting discovery, McKinney concluded that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to prove that the defendant's negligence was the
cause of her husband's death.6' As a result, she took a voluntary
nonsuit of the wrongful death action.63
Less than two months later, McKinney filed, in the same court
against the same defendant, a survival action for personal inju-
ries suffered by the decedent arising out of the same alleged neg-
ligence pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-25. The defend-
ant filed a plea in bar, asserting that the two-year statute of
limitations applicable to actions for personal injury prescribed by
Virginia Code section 8.01-243(A) barred the plaintiffs action.
The circuit court sustained the plea and dismissed the case."
On appeal, the supreme court held that the circuit court erred
in holding that the "survival action is a different cause of action
than the wrongful death action" and is therefore not saved by the
tolling provision of section 8.01-229(E)(3). 6 ' According to the
court, there was only ever a single cause of action: the defendant's
alleged medical malpractice resulting in injury to the decedent.6 8
From this cause of action arose two rights of action: (1) the dece-
dent's right to bring an action for personal injury during his life-
time, which survived to be carried on by his personal representa-
tive after his death, and (2) the personal representative's right to
bring an action for wrongful death." Because the plaintiffs sur-
vival action was timely brought within six months after entry of
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 461, 732 S.E.2d at 30.
68. Id. at 460-61, 732 S.E.2d at 29-30.
69. Id. at 460, 732 S.E.2d at 29.
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the order granting nonsuit, the judgment of the circuit court was
reversed."o
D. Accrual of a Cause of Action
Responding to a certified question from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Kiser v. A. W. Chesterton
Co., the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed whether, under
Virginia Code section 8.01-249(4), a plaintiffs cause of action for
damages due to latent mesothelioma is deemed to accrue at the
time of the mesothelioma diagnosis or, decades earlier, when the
plaintiff was diagnosed with an independent, non-malignant as-
bestos-related disease." The certified question focused specifically
on section 8.01-249(4), the statute governing when a cause of ac-
tion is deemed to accrue.72 As a general rule, a statute of limita-
tions commences to run when injury is incurred as a result of a
wrongful act." Under the common law indivisible cause of action
rule, a wrongful act generally gives rise to only a single indivisi-
ble cause of action. The court found that subsection four to Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-249 did not abrogate the common law in-
divisible cause of action principle." Instead, it created a discovery
accrual rule for asbestos exposure actions." Therefore, in re-
sponse to the certified question, the supreme court answered that
a cause of action for personal injury based on exposure to asbes-
tos accrues upon the first diagnosis by a physician of any of the
specified diseases or some other disabling asbestos-related injury
or disease .
70. Id. at 461, 732 S.E.2d at 30.
71. 285 Va. 12, 17, 736 S.E.2d 910, 913 (2013).
72. Id. at 17, 736 S.E.2d at 913. Virginia Code section 8.01-249(4) provides that a
cause of action shall accrue:
In actions for injury to the person resulting from exposure to asbestos or
products containing asbestos, when a diagnosis of asbestosis, interstitial fi-
brosis, mesothelioma, or other disabling asbestos-related injury or disease is
first communicated to the person or his agent by a physician. However, no
such action may be brought more than two years after the death of such per-
son.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249(4) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
73. Kiser, 285 Va. at 22, 736 S.E.2d at 916.
74. Id. at 21, 736 S.E.2d at 916.
75. Id. at 17, 736 S.E.2d at 913.
76. Id. at 28, 736 S.E.2d at 920.
77. Id. at 29, 736 S.E.2d at 920.
2013] 9
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E. Res Judicata
In Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., the Supreme Court of
Virginia considered the application of the doctrine of res judica-
ta." Caperton arose out of a longtime controversy between Hugh
M. Caperton, Donald Blankenship, and their respective compa-
nies." The procedural history of the case is long and complicated,
involving fifteen years of litigation in the circuit courts of both
Virginia and West Virginia, as well as proceedings in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia.o
Caperton's first suit against one of Blankenship's companies for
breach of contract was litigated in the Circuit Court of Buchanan
County, Virginia." The case before the supreme court was Caper-
ton's second Virginia action against a Blankenship company,
which was also filed in Buchanan County Circuit Court.82 The
complaint set forth allegations of tortious interference with exist-
ing and prospective contractual and business relations."
Comparing Caperton's first Virginia action to his second, the
circuit court concluded that all four elements of res judicata ex-
isted and thus sustained the defendant's plea of res judicata.84 On
appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that the
evidence from the second Virginia action was different from the
proof necessary to support the claim in the first Virginia action
and thus reversed the judgment of the circuit court. 5 Important-
78. 285 Va. 537, 539, 740 S.E.2d 1, 1 (2013).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id., 740 S.E.2d at 1-2.
82. Id. at 540, 740 S.E.2d at 2.
83. Id. at 547, 740 S.E.2d at 6. Similar tort claims were initially brought against Mas-
sey in the Circuit Court of Boone County, West Virginia, where a jury awarded the plain-
tiffs approximately $50,000,000. Id. at 545-46, 740 S.E.2d at 5. After the verdict, a
lengthy appeal process ensued. Id. On its third consideration, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of West Virginia determined that a forum selection clause in an agreement between
the parties required that suit be brought in Virginia. Id. at 547, 740 S.E.2d at 6.
84. Id. at 548, 740 S.E.2d at 7. Massey alleged, and the circuit court agreed, that the
"[p]laintiffs 'could have brought their tort and contract claims together in the First Virgin-
is Action but chose not to do so."' Id. at 547, 740 S.E.2d at 6. The parties agreed that the
law of res judicata as it existed in 1998, the time of the first Virginia action, governed the
supreme court's analysis. Id. at 549, 740 S.E.2d at 7. Prior to the adoption of Rule 1:6, the
law of res judicata in Virginia consisted of the following four elements: "(1) identity of the
remedies sought; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties; and (4) iden-
tity of the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made." Id. (quoting
Smith v. Ware, 244 Va. 374, 376, 421 S.E.2d 444, 445 (1992)).
85. Id. at 551, 555, 740 S.E.2d at 8, 10.
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ly, the court found that the first and second Virginia actions in-
volved different causes of action and that it was "abundantly
clear" that the first Virginia action for breach of contract shared
no elements with the plaintiffs' claims of tortious interference and
fraudulent misrepresentation in the second Virginia action.86 Be-
cause the evidence required to sustain each action was different,
res judicata could not operate to bar the plaintiffs' second Virgin-
ia action.
F. Burden of Proof Under the Slayer Statute
As a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held in Osman v. Osman that the burden of proof for determining
whether the act of murder had been committed, for purposes of
interpreting the slayer statute, is by a preponderance of evi-
dence." In Osman, the plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaratory
judgment that the victim's son, who had been found not guilty by
reason of insanity for her murder, was a "slayer" within the
meaning of Virginia's slayer statute." The circuit court held that
although Osman was found not guilty by reason of insanity, he
was still a slayer under Virginia Code section 55-401 and there-
fore could not share in the proceeds from his mother's estate.o
In its opinion, the supreme court described the two ways by
which a person may be declared a slayer: (1) when he is convicted
of murder or voluntary manslaughter of the decedent; or (2) if a
86. Id. at 552-53, 740 S.E.2d at 9. The supreme court reaffirmed that "[tihe test to
determine whether claims are part of a single cause of action is whether the same evi-
dence is necessary to prove each claim." Id. at 550, 740 S.E.2d at 8 (quoting Brown v. Ha-
ley, 233 Va. 210, 216, 355 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1987)).
87. Id. at 554-55, 740 S.E.2d at 10.
88. 285 Va. 384, 387-90, 737 S.E.2d 876, 877-79 (2012). Virginia's slayer statute pre-
vents an individual meeting the definition of a slayer from benefiting in any way from the
death of a decedent if the slayer has committed voluntary manslaughter or the murder of
the decedent. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-2500 to -2501 (Repl. Vol. 2012). The Osman opin-
ion refers to Virginia's slayer statute codified in Virginia Code sections 54-401 and 54-402.
See Osman, 285 Va. at 387, 737 S.E.2d at 877; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-401 to -402
(Cum. Supp. 2011). The slayer statute codified in sections 54-401 to -402 was repealed by
the General Assembly on April 4, 2012 and recodified generally at Virginia Code sections
64.2-2500 and 64.2-2501, effective Oct. 1, 2012. Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 614, 2012 Va. Acts
1167, 1307-08, 1313 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-2500 to -2501).
89. Osman, 285 Va. at 387-88, 737 S.E.2d at 877-78; see VA. CODE ANN. § 55-401
(Cum. Supp. 2011); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 55-401 (Repl. Vol. 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §
64.2-2501 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
90. Osman, 285 Va. at 388-89, 737 S.E.2d at 878.
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court determines, by a preponderance of evidence, that he com-
mitted the offense of murder or voluntary manslaughter." Of
course, a criminal "offense" must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt; thus, the court noted that the slayer statute itself is seem-
ingly internally inconsistent in that it provides that murder or
voluntary manslaughter may be proven by a preponderance of ev-
idence."
To resolve this issue of statutory construction, the court looked
to guidance from Virginia Code section 55-414, which provides
that the chapter "shall be construed broadly in order to effect the
policy of this Commonwealth that no person shall be allowed to
profit by his wrong, wherever committed."" The court also high-
lighted the purpose of this chapter of the code, which is to prevent
a person from profiting from his own wrong. 4 Giving effect to leg-
islative intention and state policy, the court interpreted the slay-
er statute as requiring proof by a preponderance of evidence of
the element of either murder or voluntarily manslaughter."
In an effort to resolve any confusion caused by the language of
the slayer statute, the court also clarified that, in considering
whether a person is a slayer under Virginia Code section 55-401,
it is only necessary to consider civil intent, not criminal intent
(mens rea)." In the civil context, intent requires only that a per-
son intended his actions-he need not know that his actions were
wrongful." In this case, because it had been stipulated at trial
that Osman intended to kill his mother, under the civil burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the evidence was suffi-
cient to prove the elements of murder for purposes of the slayer
statute."
91. Id. at 389-90, 737 S.E.2d at 879.
92. Id. at 390, 737 S.E.2d at 879.
93. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 55-414(A) (Cum. Supp. 2011) (current version at VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-2511 (Repl. Vol. 2012))).
94. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 55-414(A) (Cum. Supp. 2011) (current version at VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-2511 (Repl. Vol. 2012))).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 391, 737 S.E.2d at 880.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 392, 737 S.E.2d at 880.
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G. Justiciable Controversy
In the past year, the Supreme Court of Virginia has issued
multiple opinions discussing whether a justiciable controversy ex-
ists in a declaratory judgment action. Charlottesville Area Fitness
Club Operators Ass'n v. Albemarle County Board of Supervisors
involved two declaratory judgment actions brought by operators
of various fitness clubs ("Fitness Clubs") in the Charlottesville ar-
ea." Believing they had been improperly excluded from bidding
on the City of Charlottesville's ("City") proposed lease of property
for a non-profit recreation facility, the Fitness Clubs sought to
challenge the lease of public property by the City to the Piedmont
Family YMCA ("YMCA") and the use agreement governing the
leased property entered into between the City, Albemarle County,
and the YMCA.'o In their declaratory judgment action against
the Albemarle County Board of Supervisors ("Board"), the Fitness
Clubs alleged that the Board's award under the use agreement to
the YMCA was improper because the construction and operation
of the YMCA would be partially funded by a capital contribution
from the county.'o' In their action against the City, the Fitness
Clubs alleged that they were excluded from bidding on the lease
because the City Council had improperly limited the bids it would
accept to those that would provide for the construction of a non-
profit fitness and recreation center and because it allowed a non-
profit organization to lease city land for nominal rent.'02 Accord-
ing to the supreme court, none of these claims presented a justi-
ciable controversy. 0 3
The decision hinged upon the established principle that the de-
claratory judgment statutes cannot be used to mount a third-
party challenge to a governmental action when such a challenge
is not otherwise authorized by statute.'04 In other words, the Fit-
99. 285 Va. 87, 93, 737 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2013).
100. Id. at 93, 105, 737 S.E.2d at 4, 10.
101. Id. at 94-95, 737 S.E.2d at 4-5. According to the Fitness Clubs, the Board should
have complied with the Virginia Public Procurement Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-4300, et
seq., by either issuing a "Request for Proposals" or an "Invitation to Bid." Id. at 95, 737
S.E.2d at 5. The Fitness Clubs argued that by not doing so and by awarding the use
agreement to the YMCA, the Board effectively disqualified the Fitness Clubs as prospec-
tive bidders. Id. The supreme court disagreed, finding that the Board did not exclude any
person or organization from bidding. Id. at 105, 737 S.E.2d at 11.
102. Id. at 94-97, 105, 737 S.E.2d at 4-6, 11.
103. Id. at 106, 737 S.E.2d at 11.
104. Id. at 100, 737 S.E.2d at 8 (quoting Miller v. Highland Cnty., 274 Va. 355, 371-72,
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ness Clubs could not use the declaratory judgment statute to
make an end-run around Virginia Code section 15.2-953, which
provides no right of action to a third party to challenge a locality's
appropriation.o'0 Essentially, the Fitness Clubs were attempting
to create "greater rights than those which they previously pos-
sessed" by challenging governmental action in a manner not au-
thorized by statute and by trying to create rights that they did
not have under the Virginia Public Procurement Act.106 The court
also held that without the YMCA as a party defendant, the Fit-
ness Clubs' declaratory judgment action seeking to prevent pay-
ment under the use agreement could not be "sufficiently conclu-
sive."1o' For these reasons, the supreme court ruled that the
circuit courts did not have authority to exercise jurisdiction in the
declaratory judgment actions."s
The issue of justiciable controversy also came before the court
in Daniels v. Mobley.o' In Daniels, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered, sua sponte, whether a requisite justiciable controver-
sy existed under the declaratory judgment statute."'0 Charles
Daniels filed a declaratory judgment action in the City of Ports-
mouth Circuit Court to determine whether the game of Texas
Hold 'Em constituted illegal gambling under Virginia Code sec-
tion 18.2-325."' Daniels had been hosting Texas Hold 'Em games
and tournaments at the Poker Palace but had closed his estab-
650 S.E.2d 532, 540 (2007)).
105. Id. Virginia Code section 15.2-953 is titled "Donations to charitable institutions
and associations, volunteer and nonprofit organizations, chambers of commerce, etc." VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.2-953 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2013). Notably, the Fitness Clubs
did not institute these actions for the benefit of the taxpayers of Albemarle County. See
Charlottesville Area Fitness Club Operators Ass'n, 285 Va. at 109-10, 737 S.E.2d at 13-14
(Kisner, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 101, 737 S.E.2d at 8 (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 211 Va. 414,
421, 177 S.E.2d 519, 524 (1970)).
107. Id. at 103, 737 S.E.2d at 10 (quoting Erie Ins. Grp. v. Hughes, 240 Va. 165, 170,
393 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1990)).
108. Id. at 97, 737 S.E.2d at 6.
109. 285 Va. 402, 405, 737 S.E.2d 895, 897 (2013).
110. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-184 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
111. Id. at 406, 737 S.E.2d at 897.
"Illegal gambling" means the making, placing or receipt, of any bet or wager
in this Commonwealth of money or other thing of value, made in exchange for
a chance to win a prize, stake or other consideration or thing of value, de-
pendent upon the result of any game, contest or any other event the outcome
of which is uncertain or a matter of chance, whether such game, contest or
event, occurs or is to occur inside or outside the limits of this Commonwealth.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-325(1) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
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lishment in order to avoid prosecution after he received a letter
from the Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Portsmouth
stating that he could face prosecution for illegal gambling.11 2
Once again, the supreme court explained the well-settled law
that a circuit court cannot acquire jurisdiction over a declaratory
judgment action unless the proceeding involves an actual adjudi-
cation of rights."' The court found that Daniels's request for a
declaration that Texas Hold 'Em is not illegal gambling amounted
to a request for "a declaration that a generalized activity does not
violate a particular statute" and that his request concerned an
adjudication of facts rather than an adjudication of rights.11 4 Fur-
ther, the court held that declaratory relief was inappropriate to
restrain enforcement of a criminal prosecution."'
H. Standing
In Friends of the Rappahannock v. Caroline County Board of
Supervisors, the Supreme Court of Virginia discussed standing to
challenge a land use decision by a local governing body."6 The
plaintiffs, Friends of the Rappahannock, several local landown-
ers, and a lessee, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in
Caroline County Circuit Court challenging a special exception
permit issued by the Caroline County Board of Supervisors
("Board") to Black Marsh Farm, Inc. and Vulcan Construction
Materials, L.P. (collectively, "Black Marsh") that approved use of
a tract of land adjacent to the Rappahannock River for a sand and
gravel mining operation."' In response to the complaint, the
Board filed a demurrer and Black Marsh filed a motion to dismiss
112. Daniels, 285 Va. at 405-06, 737 S.E.2d at 897. After receipt of the letter, Daniels
filed the declaratory judgment action to determine if Texas Hold 'Em constituted illegal
gambling. Id. at 406, 737 S.E.2d at 897. During the one-day bench trial, the circuit court
granted the defendant's motion to strike, finding that Texas Hold 'Em constituted illegal
gambling and thus violated Virginia Code section 18.2-328. Id. at 406, 737 S.E.2d at 897;
see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-328 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
113. Daniels, 285 Va. at 408, 737 S.E.2d at 898 (citing Charlottesville Area Fitness
Club Operators Ass'n v. Albemarle Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 285 Va. 87, 98, 737 S.E.2d 1,
6 (2013).
114. Id. at 408-09, 737 S.E.2d at 899.
115. Id. at 410, 737 S.E.2d at 900 (citing State ex rel. Edmisten v. Tucker, 323 S.E.2d
294, 309 (N.C. 1984)). Finally, even if Daniels's declaratory judgment action had requested
a declaration of his rights, the supreme court found that such declaration would be barred
by sovereign immunity. Id. at 411-12, 737 S.E.2d at 900.
116. 286 Va. 38, 41, 743 S.E.2d 132, 133 (2013).
117. Id. at 41-42, 743 S.E.2d at 133.
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arguing that the individual complainants lacked standing to
bring the suit because they failed to show that they were ag-
grieved parties, as required by Virginia Code section 15.2-2314."'
According to the defendants, the plaintiffs' alleged injuries were
based on speculative grievances and the facts, as pled, were insuf-
ficient to establish standing."' The circuit court agreed, finding
that the complainants lacked standing.'2 0
Citing its Charlottesville Area Fitness Club Operators decision,
the supreme court reiterated the general principle that a com-
plainant must establish a justiciable controversy by alleging facts
demonstrating an actual controversy. 2 ' The court noted that the
plaintiffs claimed no ownership interest in the subject property.122
As such, they could have standing to file a declaratory judgment
action challenging the land use decision only if they could satisfy
a two-step test.'2 ' First, "the complainant must own or occupy 're-
al property within or in close proximity to the property that is the
subject of' the land use determination."24 Second, "the complain-
ant must allege facts demonstrating a particularized harm to
'some personal or property right, legal or equitable, or imposition
of a burden or obligation upon the petitioner different from that
suffered by the public generally."1
25
Applying this test, the supreme court assumed that the indi-
vidual complainants all held property interests sufficiently close
118. Id. at 43, 743 S.E.2d at 134. Virginia Code section 15.2-2314 provides:
Any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision of the
board of zoning appeals, or any aggrieved taxpayer or any officer, depart-
ment, board or bureau of the locality, may file with the clerk of the circuit
court for the county or city a petition ... specifying the grounds on which ag-
grieved within 30 days after the final decision of the board.
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2314 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
119. Friends of the Rappahannock, 286 Va. at 43, 743 S.E.2d at 134. Friends of the
Rappahannock alleged that Black Marsh's use of the river would negatively impact the
water quality and would interfere with the river's scenic beauty. Id. at 42-43, 743 S.E.2d
at 133-34. The individual complainants asserted that the potential for land disturbance,
noise, and industrial activity at the site would interfere with their quiet enjoyment of the
area and the right-of-way to the river. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 45-46, 743 S.E.2d at 135-36 (citing Charlottesville Area Fitness Club Oper-
ators Ass'n v. Albemarle Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 285 Va. 87, 98, 737 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2013)).
122. Id. at 48-49, 743 S.E.2d at 137.
123. Id. at 48, 743 S.E.2d at 137.
124. Id. (citing Va. Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415,
420, 344 S.E.2d 899, 903 (1986)).
125. Id. at 48-49, 743 S.E.2d at 137 (citing Va. Marine Res. Comm'n v. Clark, 281 Va.
679, 687, 709 S.E.2d 150, 155 (2011)).
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to the property but held that they had failed to allege sufficient
facts showing that they suffered harm different than that suf-
fered by the public generally. 2 ' The court declined to infer that
the proposed mining operation would cause actual harm to the
complainants in the absence of facts showing that the particular
use of the site for sand and gravel mining would cause the loss of
some personal or property right belonging to the complainants. 2 7
The Friends of the Rappahannock decision confirmed that "prox-
imity alone is insufficient to plead a 'justiciable interest' in a de-
claratory judgment action appealing a land use decision."'2 8 To
have standing, a complainant "must also allege sufficient facts
showing harm to some personal or proprietary right different
than that suffered by the public generally.' 2 9
I. Presumptions
Kiddell v. Labowitz, a case concerning a will contest involving a
dispute over testamentary capacity, raised the question of wheth-
er the jury should have been instructed as to the existence of the
presumption of testamentary capacity."o In Kiddell, two benefi-
ciaries under a will, Laurie and LeAnn Kiddell (collectively, "Kid-
dell") filed a complaint against Kenneth E. Labowitz, the executor
of the decedent's estate, and two other beneficiaries.' According
to the plaintiffs, the decedent had lacked testamentary capacity
when she executed a second will.13 2
At the close of Kiddell's case-in-chief, Labowitz moved to strike
the evidence, arguing that Kiddell had failed to overcome the pre-
sumption of testamentary capacity by a preponderance of evi-
dence.'" At the close of all the evidence, Kiddell moved to strike,
contending that Labowitz's evidence was insufficient to prove
that the decedent had testamentary capacity when she executed
her second will.'34 The circuit court denied both motions and al-
126. Id. at 49, 743 S.E.2d at 137.
127. Id. at 49-50, 743 S.E.2d at 138.
128. Id. at 50, 743 S.E.2d at 138.
129. Id.
130. 284 Va. 611, 615, 733 S.E.2d 622, 624 (2012).
131. Id. at 616, 733 S.E.2d at 624.
132. Id., 733 S.E.2d at 624-25.
133. Id. at 618-19, 733 S.E.2d at 626.
134. Id. at 619-21, 733 S.E.2d at 626-29.
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lowed the case to go to the jury.'35 Over Kiddell's objection, the
circuit court granted two jury instructions that enabled the jury
to consider the existence of the presumption of testamentary ca-
pacity.'36 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Labowitz. 37
On appeal, Kiddell contended that it was reversible error for
the trial court to instruct the jury on the presumption of testa-
mentary capacity because the presumption disappeared when the
trial court determined that Kiddell had presented evidence to re-
but it.'" The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, finding that
the presumption does not necessarily disappear in the face of evi-
dence to the contrary.' As the court explained, it is well estab-
lished that in a will contest, "the proponent of the will is entitled
to a presumption that testamentary capacity existed by proving
compliance with all statutory requirements for the valid execu-
tion of a will."' Although the trial court acknowledged that evi-
dence on the question of testamentary capacity had been present-
ed, the trial court did not rule that the presumption had been
rebutted-only that Kiddell's evidence could potentially rebut the
presumption.141 The presumption, however, was left in place for
consideration by the jury. 142
In considering whether the instructions to the jury were appro-
priate, the supreme court first noted that the trial court did not
actually rule that the presumption was rebutted."' Further, by
denying the motion to strike, the trial court implicitly found that
the evidence presented by Kiddell, if accepted by the jury as true
and given sufficient weight, could rebut the presumption of tes-
tamentary capacity.144 Therefore, the supreme court held that the
135. Id. at 619, 733 S.E.2d at 626.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 621, 733 S.E.2d at 627.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 627, 733 S.E.2d at 631.
140. Id. at 622, 733 S.E.2d at 628 (quoting Gibbs v. Gibbs, 239 Va. 197, 200, 387 S.E.2d
499, 501 (1990)).
141. Id. at 626-27, 733 S.E.2d at 630.
142. Id. at 627, 733 S.E.2d at 630. The supreme court stated, "Given the necessary role
of the presumption in the factual determinations, the presumption does not disappear un-
less, as a matter of law, no rational finder of fact could find that the presumption had not
been rebutted." Id., 733 S.E.2d at 630-31.
143. Id. at 626, 733 S.E.2d at 630.
144. Id.
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circuit court did not err in granting the jury instructions as to
testamentary capacity. 14 5
J. Remittitur
The issue of remittitur was brought before the Supreme Court
of Virginia in Hale v. Maersk Line Ltd., a case arising from the al-
leged sexual assault of the plaintiff by Korean police during au-
thorized shore leave.14 ' The plaintiff, a seaman, brought suit
against his former employer, Maersk Line Limited ("Maersk"),
seeking compensatory and punitive damages.14 ' The case went to
trial on the plaintiffs claims for maintenance and cure, a Jones
Act claim for negligence, and a claim based on the unseaworthi-
ness of the vessel.14 ' The jury returned a verdict awarding the
plaintiff $20,000,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in
punitive damages.14' The defendant then moved to set aside the
verdict and for a new trial, asserting that the award of compensa-
tory damages was excessive."o The circuit court agreed that the
jury verdict was excessive and ultimately set aside the punitive
damages award and remitted the compensatory damages award
to $2,000,000.2' Both parties appealed.152
On appeal, the plaintiff argued, among other things, that the
circuit court erroneously ordered remittitur and that the jury's
verdict should be reinstated because it was supported by the rec-
ord.' Maersk contended that the circuit court abused its discre-
tion when, after finding that the jury's verdict resulted from an
unfair trial, it ordered remittitur instead of a new trial on the
merits. 154 According to Maersk, the jury was improperly instruct-
ed on a legally invalid theory of liability because the evidence did
145. Id. at 630, 733 S.E.2d at 632.
146. 284 Va. 358, 364, 732 S.E.2d 8, 11-12 (2012).
147. Id. at 364, 732 S.E.2d at 11.
148. Id. at 364-65, 732 S.E.2d at 12.
149. Id. at 365, 732 S.E.2d at 12.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 366, 732 S.E.2d at 13.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 371, 376, 732 S.E.2d at 15-16, 18.
154. Id. at 376, 732 S.E.2d at 18.
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not warrant both compensatory and punitive damages for denial
of maintenance and cure."'
In discussing whether the circuit court erred in remitting the
verdict, the supreme court cited to Virginia Code section 8.01-
383.1(A), which provides authority for a circuit court to remit a
jury verdict:
In any action at law in which the trial court shall require a plaintiff
to remit a part of his recovery, as ascertained by the verdict of a jury,
or else submit to a new trial, such plaintiff may remit and accept
judgment of the court thereon for the reduced sum under protest,
but, notwithstanding such remittitur and acceptance, if under pro-
test, the judgment of the court in requiring him to remit may be re-
156
viewed by the Supreme Court ....
The court explained that "[a]though a circuit court may order
remittitur to remedy an excessive verdict, it may not use remit-
titur to remedy an unfair trial of liability issues."" The court
ruled that the order of remittitur did not correct the fact that the
circuit court erred by instructing the jury on the plaintiffs
maintenance and cure claim for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, as evidenced by the jury's award of punitive damages.
K. Due Diligence in Service of Process
The issue of sufficiency of service of process came before the
Supreme Court of Virginia in Virginia Polytechnic Institute &
State University v. Prosper Financial, Inc., when the court was
tasked with determining whether the trial court erred in setting
aside a default judgment in an action filed pursuant to Virginia
Code section 8.01-428(D).' 59 Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University ("VPI") and Prosper Financial, Inc. ("Prosper")
had entered into a research contract that provided that any notic-
es required to be given to Prosper under the contract should be
addressed to P.O. Box 331916, Miami, Florida 33233-1916.160 The
contract also stated that Prosper had offices located at 4801 Al-
155. Id.
156. Id., 732 S.E.2d at 18-19 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-383.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007
& Cum. Supp. 2013)).
157. Id. at 377, 732 S.E.2d at 19.
158. Id. at 377-78, 732 S.E.2d at 19-20.
159. 284 Va. 474, 477-78, 732 S.E.2d 246, 247-48 (2012).
160. Id. at 477-78, 732 S.E.2d at 248.
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hambra Circle, Coral Gables, Florida 33146.161 In 2010, VPI filed
a breach of contract action in the Circuit Court of Montgomery
County, Virginia.162 The court stated that because "Prosper was a
Florida corporation, VPI sought to effect service of process
through the company's statutory agent, the Secretary of the
Commonwealth."' In its affidavit for service of process on the
Secretary of the Commonwealth, VPI listed the Miami post office
box address contained in the notice provision of the contract as
Prosper's last known address. 6 4 The Secretary of the Common-
wealth then filed a Certificate of Compliance certifying that the
complaint and summons had been sent by certified mail, return
receipt requested, to Prosper at the post office box address.'
Prosper did not file responsive pleadings and, on VPI's motion,
the trial court entered a default judgment against Prosper. '66
In its motion to vacate the default judgment order, Prosper ar-
gued that the default judgment was void or voidable for failure to
comply with the requirements for service of process established
by Virginia Code section 8.01-329.1" According to Prosper, the af-
fidavit to the Secretary of the Commonwealth for substituted ser-
vice was defective because it identified as Prosper's last known
address only one of the two addresses contained in the contract.
Prosper contended that identification of both addresses was re-
quired under section 8.01-329(B), which mandates the exercise of
due diligence in locating the party to be served.6 6 The trial court
set aside the default judgment, agreeing that VPI owed a duty to
try to serve Prosper at both addresses.' The supreme court, how-
ever, reversed that decision, finding that the evidence demon-
strated that the address VPI identified on the affidavit required
by section 8.01-329(B) was reasonably calculated to provide notice
to Prosper of the pending litigation, as that was the address the
161. Id.
162. Id. at 478, 732 S.E.2d at 248.
163. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-301(3) (Cum. Supp. 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
329(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
164. Prosper Fin., Inc., 284 Va. at 478, 732 S.E.2d at 248.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-329(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
170. Prosper Fin., Inc., 284 Va. at 479, 732 S.E.2d at 248.
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parties had previously used to exchange correspondence."' Be-
cause the relevant requirements of section 8.01-329(B) were met,
the court held that service was complete and actual notice of the
proceeding was not required."' Thus, the final judgment against
Prosper was reinstated."'
L. Preservation of Error
In Brandon v. Cox, the Supreme Court of Virginia held, as a
matter of first impression, that the act of filing a motion for re-
consideration did not properly preserve an argument raised in a
motion for appellate review.17 The appellant was a tenant in
property owned by Cox and managed by Horner & Newell, Inc.
("Horner")."' When the tenant prematurely terminated her lease,
Cox retained her security deposit even though the tenant did not
owe any back rent and did not owe money for any damage to the
property."' The tenant filed a warrant in debt against Cox and
Horner to recover her security deposit."' The general district
court ruled in favor of the defendants, and the tenant appealed to
the circuit court."' After the circuit court also found in favor of
the defendants, the tenant filed a motion for reconsideration and
memorandum in support thereof in which she made the argument
that she subsequently made on appeal."' Nothing in the record
indicated that the trial court ever considered or ruled on the ten-
ant's motion for reconsideration. 80
Applying Virginia Code section 8.01-384(A) and Rule 5:25 of
the Supreme Court of Virginia, the supreme court held that the
tenant had two opportunities to preserve her argument for ap-
peal, yet failed to do so on either occasion.'"' Neither the tenant's
171. Id. at 482-83, 732 S.E.2d at 250.
172. Id. (citing Basile v. Am. Filler Serv., Inc., 231 Va. 34, 38, 340 S.E.2d 800, 802
(1986)).
173. Id. at 484, 732 S.E.2d at 251.
174. 284 Va. 251, 255-56, 736 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2012).
175. Id. at 253, 736 S.E.2d at 695.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id., 736 S.E.2d 695-96.
179. Id. at 253-54, 736 S.E.2d at 696.
180. Id. at 254, 736 S.E.2d at 696.
181. Id. at 254-56, 736 S.E.2d at 696-97. Rule 5:25 states:
No ruling of the trial court, disciplinary board, or commission before which
the case was initially heard will be considered as a basis for reversal unless
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written statement of facts nor the order entered by the circuit
court after trial indicated what argument was made to the trial
court or how the trial court ruled.'82 The tenant's second oppor-
tunity to preserve her argument was through her motion for re-
consideration, yet there is no evidence in the record that she re-
quested or received a ruling on that motion.'" Because the
supreme court could not confirm that the trial court was ever
made aware of the motion for reconsideration, the case could not
be heard by the supreme court upon the same record upon which
it was heard in the trial court.'84 As a result, the supreme court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court."'
As Justice Mims explained in his dissenting opinion, this rul-
ing is a marked change from the court's prior holding that a writ-
ten post-trial motion for reconsideration is sufficient to preserve
an argument for appeal. 88 The holding in Brandon v. Cox makes
clear that the filing of a motion for reconsideration alone, without
evidence that the motion was ever ruled on, is inadequate to
properly preserve an argument for appeal. 8 7
M. Appeal Bonds
In Henderson v. Ayres & Hartnett, P.C., the Supreme Court of
Virginia considered, among other questions, whether the circuit
court erred in refusing to suspend execution of a judgment order
pending appeal in accordance with Virginia Code section 8.01-
676.1(C), which sets forth the security required for such a sus-
pension.' The plaintiff, Thomas Henderson, had retained the law
an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling,
except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of jus-
tice. A mere statement that the judgment or award is contrary to the law and
the evidence is not sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review.
VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
182. Brandon, 284 Va. at 254, 736 S.E.2d at 696.
183. Id. at 255, 736 S.E.2d at 697.
184. Id. at 256, 736 S.E.2d at 697.
185. Id. at 257, 736 S.E.2d at 698.
186. Id. (Mims, J., dissenting) (citing Majorana v. Crown Cen. Petroleum Corp., 260
Va. 521, 525, 539 S.E.2d 426, 428 (2000)).
187. Id. at 256, 736 S.E.2d at 697.
188. 285 Va. 556, 559, 740 S.E.2d 518, 519 (2013).
An appellant who wishes execution of the judgment or award from which an
appeal is sought to be suspended during the appeal shall .. . file an appeal
bond or irrevocable letter of credit conditioned upon the performance or satis-
faction of the judgment and payment of all damages incurred in consequence
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firm of Ayres & Hartnett, P.C. ("Ayres & Harnett") as his counsel
in two cases filed against him by his brother relating to Hender-
son's administration of the family's trusts and estates.' Hender-
son and his brother settled the cases on the eve of trial, agreeing
that Henderson would sell certain real property belonging to the
decedent and would allow his siblings to recover from the pro-
ceeds of the sale the funds that Henderson owed them.' A buyer
entered into a contract to purchase the property, and the settle-
ment statement at closing specified that a seller's expense of
$130,000 in attorney's fees to Ayres & Hartnett would be paid out
of Henderson's share of the proceeds."' Henderson disputed the
inclusion and amount of attorney's fees in the settlement state-
ment, but rather than jeopardize the sale of the property, all par-
ties agreed to go forward with the closing.192 The $130,000 in at-
torney's fees was paid into the court for future distribution. 93
Over Henderson's objections, the circuit court found that Ayres &
Hartnett's fees were reasonable and ordered that the fees be dis-
tributed to Ayres & Hartnett."' Subsequently, Henderson moved
for the suspension of the execution of the award pending ap-
peal.'9 The circuit court denied this motion and ordered the im-
mediate distribution of the fees."
The supreme court noted that whether the trial court erred in
refusing to suspend execution of the judgment was a question of
statutory interpretation.' The supreme court first explained that
the circuit court's order for disbursement of the proceeds from the
sale to Ayres & Harnett "was a judgment according to Code §
8.01-669."1" Consequently, the court found that section 8.01-
of such suspension, and ... execution shall be suspended upon the filing of
such security and the timely prosecution of such appeal. Such security shall
be continuing and additional security shall not be necessary except as to any
additional amount which may be added or to any additional requirement
which may be imposed by the courts.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
189. Henderson, 285 Va. at 559, 740 S.E.2d 519.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 560, 740 S.E.2d at 519.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id., 740 S.E.2d at 520.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 561, 740 S.E.2d at 520 (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 538, 542,
733 S.E.2d 638, 640 (2012)).
198. Id. at 562, 740 S.E.2d at 520. Virginia Code section 8.01-669 defines "judgment" to
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676.1(C) applied to the disbursement order."' As the court had
previously explained, the purpose of section 8.01-676.1(C) "is to
secure payment of the full judgment amount and all damages in-
curred as a result of the suspension."2 "o Payment of a lesser
amount would only "undermine the security of the judgment to
which a prevailing party is entitled in the event that an appellant
does not succeed on appeal."20'
Henderson requested that the court continue to hold the funds
pending an appeal and set an appeal bond that would adequately
cover any potential damages that might be incurred because of
the suspension, such as loss of interest on the $130,000 and costs
assessed against Henderson.202 The circuit court's decision to deny
this request, according to the supreme court, was an error.203 The
supreme court held that "[t]he circuit court erred in not setting a
bond adequate to satisfy all damages resulting from suspending
execution of the judgment as required by Code § 8.01-676.1(C)." 20 4
However, the court found this error to be harmless because the
circuit court's award to Ayres & Hartnett was proper.20'
N. Pleading Affirmative Defenses
In New Dimensions, Inc. v. Tarquini, the Virginia Supreme
Court addressed whether the circuit court erred in holding that
the four defenses set forth in the federal Equal Pay Act ("EPA")
are affirmative defenses that are waived if not pled.206 New Di-
mensions, Inc. involved a female former employee, Catherine
Tarquini, who brought suit against her former employer, New
Dimensions, Inc. ("NDI"), for violating the Equal Pay Act, among
other things.20 7 In its answer, NDI denied Tarquini's allegation
that it had violated the EPA, but NDI did not affirmatively plead
include "a decree, order, finding, or award." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-669 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
199. Henderson, 285 Va. at 562, 740 S.E.2d at 520.
200. Id. (citing Tauber v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 520, 545, 562 S.E.2d 118, 132
(2002)).
201. Id.
202. Id., 740 S.E.2d at 521.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 565, 740 S.E.2d at 523.
206. 286 Va. 28, 31, 743 S.E.2d 267, 268 (2013); see 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
207. Id.
2013]1 25
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the defenses articulated in the statute.20 During discovery, NDI
disclosed information regarding its seniority and merit-based
compensation system in an effort to explain why Tarquini was
paid less than other employees, both male and female, who held
the same job.209 Just before trial, Tarquini filed a motion in limine
to exclude such evidence in defense of the EPA claim on the basis
that NDI had not pled any affirmative defense to the claim.2 10 The
circuit court granted the motion in limine and denied NDI's mo-
tion for reconsideration.' At the conclusion of the three-day
bench trial, the court awarded Tarquini damages on her EPA
claim.212 Based upon its earlier ruling on the motion in limine, the
court refused to consider NDI's defenses to the EPA claim.213
On appeal, NDI argued that the circuit court erred in granting
Tarquini's motion in limine and in preventing NDI from present-
ing evidence of its gender-neutral compensation system at trial.214
NDI contended that it was not required to plead this affirmative
defense expressly because the EPA specifically sets forth such a
compensation system as a defense."' Interestingly, this case re-
quired the court to apply the reverse-Erie doctrine.21 6 Because it
was a federal statutory action brought in state court, the court
applied federal substantive law and then had to determine
whether Virginia procedural law governed the procedural aspects
of the case.217 Finding that the Virginia rules concerning the
pleading of affirmative defenses were not expressly preempted by
federal statute and that the application of Virginia pleading
standards to the EPA affirmative defenses would not lead to a
substantial difference in outcomes, the court decided to apply
Virginia procedural law concerning the pleading of affirmative
defenses in EPA actions brought in Virginia.1
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 32, 743 S.E.2d at 269.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 34, 743 S.E.2d at 270.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 35, 743 S.E.2d at 270-71.
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After noting the general rule that affirmative defenses must be
pled in order to be relied upon at trial, the supreme court went on
to explain that, unlike traditional affirmative defenses, the EPA
affirmative defenses are specifically listed in the statute that cre-
ates the cause of action. 219 Also, unlike traditional affirmative de-
fenses, which are not necessarily apparent from the allegations
pled and can be unrelated to the elements of the cause of action,
the EPA defenses pose little risk of surprise.220 In fact, the plain-
tiff is put on notice of the assertion of an affirmative defense
when the defendant generally denies that a pay differential is
based on gender. 221 The supreme court reversed the judgment of
the circuit court, finding that because the four statutory defenses
under the EPA are express exceptions contained within the stat-
ute that creates the cause of action, and because there is little
risk of surprise or prejudice, Virginia procedural law does not re-
quire that such affirmative defenses be pled.222
0. Judicial Privilege
In Mansfield v. Bernabei, the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
sidered, in a defamation case, whether the doctrine of absolute
judicial privilege applies to communications made before the fil-
ing of an action.2 3 Mansfield involved a defamation suit for
statements made in a draft complaint.224 After his termination
from Horizon House, a residential condominium in Arlington,
Virginia, Michael A. Ford filed a complaint with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that he had
been discriminated against on the basis of his race.225 James M.
Mansfield, counsel to Horizon House, allegedly wrote a letter con-
taining defamatory statements about Ford to the Horizon House
board.226 Ford, who was represented by Bernabei & Wachtel,
PLLC ("Bernabei & Wachtel"), then sent a demand letter and a
draft complaint marked "Draft-For Settlement Purposes Only"
to numerous individuals and entities naming Mansfield as a de-
219. Id. at 36, 743 S.E.2d at 271.
220. Id. at 36-37, 743 S.E.2d at 271.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 37, 743 S.E.2d at 271-72.
223. 284 Va. 116, 118-19, 727 S.E.2d 69, 71 (2012).
224. Id. at 119, 727 S.E.2d at 71.
225. Id. at 118-19, 727 S.E.2d at 71.
226. Id. at 119, 727 S.E.2d at 71.
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fendant.227 After Ford did not receive a response to his settlement
proposal, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia.22 8 Subsequently, Mansfield
filed a complaint in Fairfax County Circuit Court alleging that he
was defamed by statements made in Bernabei & Wachtel's draft
complaint.229 The defendants demurred, arguing that the state-
ments made in the draft complaint were privileged.230 Mansfield,
however, argued that there was no judicial privilege because
there was no pending judicial proceeding when the draft com-
plaint was communicated.2 3 1 The circuit court sustained the de-
murrers and ruled that absolute or judicial privilege applied to
the communications contained in the draft complaint.23 2 The su-
preme court affirmed this ruling.23 3
Applying the law of absolute judicial privilege to communica-
tions preliminary to proposed judicial proceedings, the court ar-
ticulated the following requirements: (1) the court must examine
whether the statement was made preliminary to a proposed pro-
ceeding; (2) the court must examine whether the statement was
related to a proceeding contemplated in good faith and under se-
rious consideration, and (3) the court must examine whether the
communication was disclosed to interested persons.234 In this case,
the supreme court determined that all requirements had been
met and therefore the court did not err in finding that absolute
privilege attached to the draft complaint.235
III. AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF COURT
A. Voir Dire
Rule 3:22A, titled "Examination of Prospective Trial Jurors
(Voir Dire)," is newly added to the Rules of the Supreme Court of
227. Id.
228. Id. The complaint that was filed was substantially similar to the draft complaint.
Id.
229. Id.
230. Id., 727 S.E.2d at 71-72.
231. Id., 727 S.E.2d at 72.
232. Id. at 119-20, 727 S.E.2d at 72. The court limited the judicial privilege "only to
interested parties in good faith for the purpose of attempting to settle the underlying dis-
pute preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding." Id.
233. Id. at 126, 727 S.E.2d at 75.
234. Id. at 125, 727 S.E.2d at 75.
235. Id. at 126, 727 S.E.2d at 75.
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Virginia.2 36 The rule sets forth certain questions that the court is
to ask prospective jurors, as well as the procedure for excusing a
prospective juror on a challenge for cause.2 " Importantly, the rule
also gives counsel the right to ask questions to any prospective
juror relevant to the juror's qualifications as an impartial juror.
Rule 3:22A is set forth below, in its entirety:
(a) Examination-After the prospective jurors are sworn on the
voir dire, the court shall question them individually or collectively to
determine whether anyone:
(1) Is related by blood, adoption, or marriage to the accused or to
the Plaintiff or Defendant;
(2) Is an officer, director, agent or employee of the Plaintiff or De-
fendant;
(3) Has any interest in the trial or the outcome of the case;
(4) Has acquired any information about the case or the parties
from the news media or other sources and, if so, whether such infor-
mation would affect the juror's impartiality in the case;
(5) Has expressed or formed any opinion about the case;
(6) Has a bias or prejudice against the Plaintiff or Defendant; or
(7) Has any reason to believe the juror might not gave a fair and
impartial trial to the Plaintiff and Defendant based solely on the law
and the evidence.
Thereafter, the court, and counsel as of right, may examine on
oath the venire, and any prospective juror, and ask questions rele-
vant to the qualifications as an impartial juror. A party objecting to a
juror may introduce competent evidence ln [sic] support of the objec-
tion.
(b) Challenge for Cause-The court, on its own motion or following
a challenge for cause, may excuse a prospective juror if it appears
the juror is not qualified, and another shall be drawn or called and
239placed in the juror's stead for the trial of that case.
B. Virginia Rules of Evidence
Rule 2:706 of the Virginia Rules of Evidence, concerning the
use of learned treatises with experts, has been amended to con-
form to the General Assembly's amendment to Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-401.1.240 Rule 2:706 now provides, in pertinent part:
236. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:22A (Repl. Vol. 2013).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Order Amending VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:706 (June 21, 2013) (effective July 1, 2013),
available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/2013_0621-rules_2-706
2_804_3_204_7.pdf; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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If the statements [contained in published treatises] are to be intro-
duced through an expert witness upon direct examination, copies of
the specific statements shall be designated as literature to be intro-
duced during direct examination and provided to opposin parties 30
days prior to trial unless otherwise ordered by the court.
The amendment to the rule also adds the following sentence:
If a statement has been designated by a party in accordance with
and satisfies the requirements of this rule, the expert witness called
by that party need not have relied on the statement at the time of
forming his opinion in order to read the statement into evidence dur-
242ing direction examination at trial.
Rule 2:804 of the Virginia Rules of Evidence, concerning hear-
say exceptions applicable where the declarant is unavailable, has
also been amended to include a discussion of corroboration by
business records. 243 The rule now includes the following language:
For the purposes of this section, and in addition to corroboration by
any other competent evidence, an entry authored by an adverse or
interested party contained in a business record may be competent
evidence for corroboration of the testimony of an adverse or interest-
ed party. If authentication of the business record is not admitted in a
request for admission, such business record shall be authenticated
by a person other than the author of the entry who is not an adverse
or interested party whose conduct is at issue in the allegations of the
244
complaint.
C. Depositions
Rule 4:5, discussing depositions, has undergone only a slight
change, presumably to address "speaking" objections. The rule
now clarifies that "[a]ny objection must be stated concisely in a
nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner. 2 4 ' However, the
amendment does not change the fact that evidence objected to is
taken subject to the objections.24 6
241. Order Amending VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:706 (June 21, 2013) (effective July 1,
2013), available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scvlamendments/2013_0621_rules
2_706_2_804_3_20_47.pdf.
242. Id.
243. Order Amending VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:804 (June 21, 2013) (effective July 1,
2013), available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/2013_0621_rules
2_706_2_804_3_20_4j7.pdf.
244. Id.
245. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:5(6) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
246. Id.
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Rule 4:7 regarding the use of depositions in court proceedings
has also been amended recently. Subsection (e) now reads: "No
motion for summary judgment or to strike the evidence shall be
sustained when based in whole or in part upon any depositions
under Rule 4:5, unless such use of depositions is permitted by §
8.01-420.",247 Rule 3:20 discussing summary judgment has under-
gone a similar addition of a reference to section 8.01-420.248
D. General Provisions as to Pleadings
Rule 1:4, setting forth the general provisions as to pleadings,
has undergone a minor change. Effective January 1, 2013, the
rule was amended to require additional attorney identifying and
contact information."' Specifically, the rule now requires that
every pleading, motion, or other paper served or filed contain at
the foot the Virginia State Bar number and any e-mail address of
the counsel of record submitting it, along with counsel's office ad-
dress, telephone number, and facsimile number."o
247. Order Amending VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:7 (June 21, 2013) (effective July 1, 2013), avail-
able at http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/2013 0621_rules_2_706_2_8
04_3_20_4_7.pdf.
248. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:20 (Repl. Vol. 2013). Virginia Code section 8.01-420, which was
rewritten by the General Assembly in 2013, now reads:
A. Except as provided in subsection B, no motion for summary judgment or
to strike the evidence shall be sustained when based in whole or in part upon
any discovery depositions under Rule 4:5, unless all parties to the suit or ac-
tion shall agree that such deposition may be so used. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, requests for admissions for which the responses are submitted in
support of a motion for summary judgment may be based in whole or in part
upon any discovery depositions under Rule 4:5 and may include admitted
facts learned or referenced in such a deposition, provided that any such re-
quest for admission shall not reference the deposition or require the party to
admit that the deponent gave specific testimony.
B. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A, a motion for summary
judgment seeking dismissal of any claim or demand for punitive damages
may be sustained, as to the punitive damages claim or demand only, when
based in whole or in part upon any discovery depositions under Rule 4:5.
However, such a motion may not be based upon discovery depositions under
Rule 4:5 with respect to any claim or demand for punitive damages based on
the operation of a motor vehicle by a person while under the influence of al-
cohol, any narcotic drug, or any other self-administered intoxicant or drug.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
249. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:4 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
250. Id.
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E. Electronic Filing and Service
Effective January 1, 2013, multiple rules have been amended
to provide more detailed information regarding electronic filing,
which is becoming more and more prevalent in Virginia courts.
The rule governing electronic filing and service, Rule 1:17, un-
derwent some significant changes. 251' First, the system operational
standards have been amended to allow remote electronic access to
documents submitted in an electronically filed case to "active
members of the Virginia State Bar and their authorized agents,
who have complied with the registration requirements to use the
electronic filing system."252 This language replaces the portion of
the rule that gave electronic access to "counsel of record, includ-
ing parties appearing pro se.""'
Subsection (d)(5) of Rule 1:17, which discusses the procedures
for filing using the E-Filing Portal, has also been amended to
clarify when a document is deemed filed. As amended, the rule
states:
[A]n electronic document .. . shall be deemed filed on the date that it
is received in the E-Filing Portal without regard to whether the fil-
ing occurred within or outside of standard business hours. If the
electronic document is received in the E-Filing Portal on a Saturday,
Sunday, legal holiday, or any day or part of a day on which the
clerk's office is closed as authorized by an act of the General Assem-
bly, then such document shall be deemed filed on the next day that is
not a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day or part of a day on
which the clerk's office is closed.25 4
Subsection (d)(7), regarding a clerk's notice of defects in a fil-
ing, striking documents, and court orders, has also been substan-
tially changed. In the case of an incorrect or missing fee under
the amended rule, the clerk of court is now authorized to immedi-
ately process payment of the correct fee if the filing party has
previously provided a credit or payment account. 255 Alternatively,
if processing by the clerk of the proper payment through a credit
or payment account is not feasible, the clerk will send an elec-
tronic notice to the filing party and all other parties who have ap-
251. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:17 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
252. R. 1:17(c)(5) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
253. Compare id., with R. 1:17(c)(5) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
254. R. 1:17(d)(5) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
255. R. 1:17(d)(7)(i)(A) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
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peared in the case."' Similarly, if counsel files a document in the
wrong case or docket number, the amended rule directs the clerk
to notify the filing party as soon as practicable.257 Copies of all no-
tices transmitted by the clerk under subpart (d)(7), as well as cop-
ies of any documents that were stricken, are to be retained by the
clerk in the permanent electronic case file.258 Subsection (d)(7) no
longer instructs the clerk to transmit a notice of hearing for the
judge to consider an order striking a defective electronically filed
document.
Rule 3:3, governing the filing of pleadings, has also seen a mi-
nor edit to the subsection discussing electronic filing. Amended
subsection (b)(1) now requires that if a civil action is designated
as an electronically filed case upon consent of all parties, "[s]uch
designation shall be made promptly, complying with all filing and
procedural requirements for making such designations as may be
prescribed by such circuit court." "2
In an electronically filed case, the plaintiff must still "furnish
paper copies to the clerk as provided in [Rule 3:4].",260 A new sub-
section, (c)(2), has been added to Rule 3:4 to address the require-
ment of additional copies in electronically filed cases. The new
subsection states:
Additionally, in an Electronically Filed Case, if the clerk has been
provided by the plaintiff with a credit or payment account through
which to obtain payment of fees for duplication of required copies of
filings, the clerk shall promptly prepare additional copies of the
pleading as needed, and process payment through such credit or
payment account; or, if processing by the clerk of the proper payment
for duplication of additional copies of the pleading through a credit
or payment account authorized by the filing party is not feasible, the
clerk shall proceed as provided in subpart (c)(1) of this Rule."'
F. Taxable Costs
Rule 5:35, which governs attorney's fees, costs, and notarized
bills of costs in the Supreme Court of Virginia, as well as Rule
256. R. 1:17(d)(7)(i)(B) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
257. R. 1:17(d)(7)(ii) (Repl. Vol. 2013). The rule provides that notice may be given
"through the E-Filing system, by telephone, or by other effective means." Id.
258. R. 1:17(d)(7)(iii) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
259. R. 3:3(b)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
260. R. 3:4(a) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
261. R. 3:4(c)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
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5A:30, discussing costs and notarized bills of costs in the Courts
of Appeals, were both amended effective January 1, 2013, to state
that costs incurred in the preparation of transcripts may be taxa-
ble in the court.262 Both rules now include a citation to Virginia
Code section 17.1-128, which provides that "[a] transcript of the
record, when required by any party, shall be paid for by such par-
ty. The court on appeal may provide that such cost may, in civil
cases, be reimbursed to the party prevailing."263
G. Inmate Filing
By order dated December 14, 2012, and effective January 1,
2013, the Supreme Court of Virginia revised Rule 5:5 regarding
inmate filing to include a more descriptive definition of "institu-
tion.""' Prior to the amendment, the rule referenced only inmates
confined to "an institution," without clarifying what that term
meant.265 As amended, the rule applies to an "individual confined
in an institution, including a prison, jail, or the Virginia Center
for Behavioral Rehabilitation."'
IV. NEW LEGISLATION
A. Evidence
By enacting H.B. 1477, the 2013 General Assembly amended
the Virginia Deadman's Statute, to state that, in addition to cor-
roboration by any other competent evidence, "an entry authored
by an adverse or interested party contained in a business record
may be competent evidence for corroboration of the testimony of
,,167an adverse or interested party. The statute now speaks to au-
thentication of the business record: "If authentication of the busi-
ness record is not admitted in a request for admission, such busi-
ness record shall be authenticated by a person other than the
262. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:35(c) (Repl. Vol. 2013); VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:30(b) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
263. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-128 (Repl. Vol. 2010); R. 5:35(c) (Repl. Vol. 2013); R. 5A:30B
(Repl. Vol. 2013).
264. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:5(d) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
265. R. 5:5 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
266. R. 5:5(d) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
267. Act of Mar. 5, 2013, ch. 161, 2013 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
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author of the entry who is not an adverse or interested party
whose conduct is at issue in the allegations of the complaint."
The 2013 General Assembly also amended and reenacted Vir-
ginia Code section 16.1-88.2, relating to evidence of medical re-
ports or records. The amendment clarifies when records of bills of
a hospital or other medical facility may be admitted. Pursuant to
the amendment, records or bills shall be admitted if
(i) the party intending to present evidence by the use of records or
bills gives the opposing party or parties a copy of the records or bills
and written notice of such intention 10 days in advance of trial and
(ii) attached to the records or bills is a sworn statement of the custo-
dian thereof that the same is a true and accurate copy of the records
269
or bills of such hospital or other medical facility.
With this amendment, medical records and bills are now treated
in much the same manner as medical reports-they may be in-
troduced into evidence in the same manner and notice of inten-
tion to present them must be given to the opposing party before
*270trial.
B. Expert Witnesses
By amending Virginia Code sections 8.01-20.1, -50.1 and 16.1-
83.1, the 2013 General Assembly has provided an alternative
method of expert witness certification for the court: in camera re-
view. 71 The amendments provide that in medical malpractice ac-
tions, "[t]he court, upon good cause shown, may conduct an in
camera review of the certifying expert opinion obtained by the
plaintiff as the court may deem appropriate."27 2
Another change related to expert witnesses is the 2013 General
Assembly's amendment to section 8.01-401.1, discussing opinion
testimony by experts. The amendment adds the following lan-
guage:
If a statement has been designated by a party in accordance with
and satisfies the requirements of this section, the expert witness
268. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
269. Act of Mar. 12, 2013, ch. 145, 2013 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-88.2 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
270. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-882 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
271. Act of Mar. 12, 2013, ch. 65, 2013 Va. Acts _, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8:01-20.1, -50.1, 16.1-83.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
272. Id.
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called by that party need not have relied on the statement at the
time of forming his opinion in order to read the statement into evi-
273dence during direct examination at trial.
C. Service of Process
The 2013 General Assembly made several changes to how ser-
vice of process is made on non-residents and foreign corporations.
First, in addition to substituted service in accordance with Virgin-
ia Code section 8.01-329, foreign corporations may now be per-
sonally served with process outside of Virginia in accordance with
Virginia Code section 8.01-320.274 Second, service of process on ei-
ther the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles or
the Secretary of the Commonwealth is now effective on the date
service is made on the Commissioner or the Secretary.27 Finally,
the amendment to section 8.01-329 clarifies that service of pro-
cess or notice on the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall be ef-
fective on the date when service is made on the Secretary, and it
is the duty of the Secretary to provide a receipt to the party seek-
ing service if service was accomplished using a method that does
not provide a return of service."'
D. Venue
With regard to venue in civil cases, the 2013 General Assembly
amended Virginia Code section 8.01-262 to provide that Category
B permissible venue exists where a defendant that is not an indi-
vidual has its "principal office or principal place of business."277
Accordingly, permissible venue no longer exists where a corpora-
tion's mayor, rector, president, or other chief officer resides.2 78 The
amendment also provides that permissible venue exists where a
defendant regularly conducts substantial business activity, add-
ing a new requirement that there must be a "practical nexus to
273. Act of Mar. 14, 2013, ch. 379, Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
274. Act of Mar, 6, 2013, ch. 113, Va. Acts , (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-301 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
275. Ch. 113, 2013 Va. Acts at - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-310,
-329 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
276. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-329 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
277. Act of Mar. 5, 2013, ch. 71, 2013 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-262 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
278. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-262 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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the forum including, but not limited to, the location of fact wit-
nesses, plaintiffs, or other evidence to the action."2"
E. Use of Depositions
The 2013 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
8.01-420 to allow that
requests for admissions for which the responses are submitted in
support of a motion for summary judgment may be based in whole or
in part upon any discovery depositions under Rule 4:5 and may in-
clude admitted facts learned or referenced in such a deposition, pro-
vided that any such request for admission shall not reference the
deposition or reuire the party to admit that the deponent gave spe-
cific testimony.
The amendment also adds a new subpart B, which states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A, a motion for sum-
mary judgment seeking dismissal of any claim or demand for puni-
tive damages may be sustained, as to the punitive damages claim or
demand only, when based in whole or in part upon any discovery
depositions under Rule 4:5. However, such a motion may not be
based upon discovery depositions under Rule 4:5 with respect to any
claim or demand for punitive damages based on the operation of a
motor vehicle by a person while under the influence of alcohol, any
narcotic drug, or any other self-administered intoxicant or drug.
F. Nonsuit
Virginia Code section 8.01-380 provides:
If notice to take a nonsuit of right is given to the opposing party
within seven days of trial or during trial, the court in its discretion
may assess against the nonsuiting party reasonable witness fees and
travel costs of expert witnesses scheduled to appear at trial, which
are actually incurred by the opposing party, solely by reason of the
failure [of the nonsuiting party] to give notice at least seven days
prior to trial.282
279. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-262(3) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
280. Act of Mar. 5, 2013, ch. 76, 2013 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-420 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
281. Id.
282. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(C) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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The 2013 General Assembly's amendment details what is re-
quired to prove the reasonableness of the costs. Subsection C now
includes the following language:
Invoices, receipts, or confirmation of payment shall be admissible to
prove reasonableness without the need to offer testimony to support
the authenticity or reasonableness of such documents, and may, in
the court's discretion, satisfy the reasonableness requirement under
this subsection. Nothing herein shall preclude any party from offer-
ing additional evidence or testimony to support or rebut the reasona-
283bleness requirement.
G. Statute of Limitations
The 2013 General Assembly amended Virginia Code sections
8.01-36 and -243, which relate to actions to recover expenses for
an infant's injury. The amendment to Virginia Code section 8.01-
36 adds subsection B:
For causes of action that accrue on or after July 1, 2013, the past and
future expenses of curing or attempting to cure an infant of personal
injuries proximately caused by a tort-feasor are damages recoverable
by an infant in a cause of action against the tort-feasor and, if appli-
cable to the infant's cause of action, are subject to the limitation on
damages in § 8.01-581.15. Any parent or guardian of such infant who
has paid for or is personally obligated to pay for past or future ex-
penses to cure or attempt to cure the infant shall have a lien and
right of reimbursement against any recovery by the infant up to the
amount the parent or guardian has actually paid or is personally ob-
ligated to pay. The right to reimbursement of any parent or guardian
shall accrue upon the first tender of funds of any recovery from a
tort-feasor to the infant. Court approval of the infant settlement
shall release party defendants from all claims for past or future ex-
penses of curing or attempting to cure the infant.
Nothing in this section shall relieve a parent of the obligation to
pay for the medical expenses of curing or attempting to cure the in-
fant as such obligation exists under current law.
The amendment to Virginia Code section 8.01-243 simply pro-
vides that "[a]n infant's claim for medical expenses pursuant to
subsection B of § 8.01-36 accruing on or after July 1, 2013, shall
be governed by the applicable statute of limitations that applies
to the infant's cause of action.""'
283. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(C) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
284. Act of Mar. 20, 2013, ch. 551, 2013 Va. Acts ,__ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-36 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
285. VA. CODE ANN. § 8:01-243 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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